Low Cost of Living ≠ Quality of Life

Helen Reicher

3 days ago

19 min read

The money is there. Now it’s time to decide whom it should help. Here are three solutions the State of Kansas and the City of Wichita could act on now to help the working class.

Wichita and Kansas’s low cost of living is a source of local pride, often prompting the question, “How can one not afford to live in Wichita, Kansas?” However, the answer depends entirely on how you define “living.”

A genuine quality of life entails affording necessities without sacrificing life-saving medications, skipping meals, falling behind on bills, or enduring constant anxiety about housing insecurity. Emergency savings are crucial for easing the stress of unforeseen expenses that can escalate into full-blown crises. In contrast, retirement savings provide a vital layer of security against an unpredictable future. Persistent financial uncertainty erodes one’s quality of life, transforming existence into a perpetual struggle for survival. If the cost of living leaves no time, energy, or resources for enjoyment, the purpose of continued effort becomes questionable.

Living should = Quality of Life.

Wichita and Sedgwick County exemplify the severity of this financial strain at the local level. The 2026 Point-in-Time Count identified 859 individuals without stable housing on a single night, including 222 living outdoors or in uninhabitable conditions. In 2025 alone, 2,077 households experienced homelessness for the first time, marking a 147% increase since 2020. At the same time, over one-third of Sedgwick County households lived paycheck to paycheck, while tens of thousands of lower-income renters and homeowners spent over 30% of their income on housing (United Way of the Plains, 2026).

Kansas as a whole is not immune. WalletHub recently ranked Kansas No. 1 in the nation for financial distress, based on factors such as damaged credit, distressed accounts, bankruptcy filings, and searches for debt and loans. Non-business bankruptcy filings surged by nearly 12% in a single year (WalletHub, 2026). This reality is often overlooked when boasting that Kansas is less expensive than other states. Lower costs, compared to financially punitive locations, do not guarantee financial security for Kansans.

These figures serve as critical warning signs, illustrating the dire consequences when individuals lack a financial buffer, safety net, or margin between barely making ends meet and losing everything. A single missed paycheck, medical bill, car repair, rent increase, or utility spike can destabilize an entire household. The question is not whether Kansas and Wichita can respond, but whether our government is willing to treat this as the crisis it demonstrably is.

Stop Investing at the Top While the People Struggle

The State of Kansas and local governments can implement policy choices that would directly ease pressure on household budgets. Kansas can help return investor-controlled housing to residents, eliminate taxes on groceries and other necessities, and raise the minimum wage to ensure full-time employment provides greater financial stability. None of these solutions requires waiting for housing costs, inflation, or wages to self-correct. They require lawmakers to prioritize their constituents’ financial stability.

These three solutions approach the problem from different angles but rest on the same principle: people need more of their own money left after covering basic living expenses. This entails increasing the housing supply available to residents rather than investors, eliminating taxes on unavoidable purchases, and mandating wages that accurately reflect the actual cost of living. Kansas cannot continue directing hundreds of millions of dollars toward corporations and economic-development incentives. At the same time, those working in that economy struggle to afford housing, food, utilities, childcare, emergencies, retirement, or even enough financial security to enjoy their lives. Economic growth means little if the people creating and sustaining that economy cannot afford to live in it.

Three Solutions for Enhanced Public Welfare

These three proposals address a singular goal from three distinct angles: lowering housing costs, reducing essential spending, and increasing workers’ disposable income. No single solution will solve the affordability crisis alone. Each proposal includes a clear funding mechanism, avoiding the common pitfall of simply shifting costs onto working households or local governments. Together, they aim to lower household expenses, strengthen financial stability, and reorient public policy to help people keep more of their earnings, rather than continuing to concentrate public resources and economic power at the top.

Reclaiming Kansas Homes for Residents

Kansas has approximately 1.31 million housing units, including over 1 million single-family homes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2024).

Although large institutional investors own a relatively small share of Kansas housing statewide, their purchases of single-family homes for rental purposes remove these properties from the owner-occupied market. The AEI Housing Center, which defines institutional investors as companies owning at least 100 homes, estimates they control about 0.3% of Kansas’s single-family housing, representing roughly 3,000 houses (AEI Housing Center, 2026).

Short-term rentals remove housing more directly from the residential market when entire houses, apartments, or condominiums primarily serve as tourist lodging. AirDNA, a private short-term rental data company, identified 911 active listings in Wichita in August 2026. Approximately 90.6% of these were entire-home listings rather than private rooms. However, these figures are market estimates, not an official count of non-owner-occupied short-term rentals, and 47.2% of the listings required stays of at least 30 days (AirDNA, 2026).

Therefore, the core issue is not merely who owns housing, but how much residential property is being diverted from people seeking permanent homes to large investment portfolios or commercial lodging.

Phase Out Investor-Controlled HousingKansas should implement a policy to transition investor-controlled housing to resident ownership. This involves a mandated, gradual divestment of single-family homes by large investment entities and a statewide curtailment of non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in all residential properties.

Successful implementation requires collaboration between state and local governments. Kansas would establish a consistent statewide policy to ensure uniform protections and prevent a fragmented approach. State legislation would define large corporate owners and non-owner-occupied short-term rentals, mandate a 50% reduction in holdings, institute purchase protections for tenants and owner-occupants, establish minimum enforcement standards, and require comprehensive reporting.

Local governments (cities and counties) would administer the program, identifying properties, issuing registrations and licenses, monitoring compliance, enforcing ordinances, and overseeing the transition to long-term residential use. The state would provide the legal framework, funding, data systems, and minimum protection standards, while local entities manage day-to-day implementation.

Owner-occupied short-term rentals (renting a room, ADU, or portion of a primary residence) would remain permissible. The policy would begin with a registration and preparation period to identify covered properties and corporate entities, distinguish between owner-occupied and non-owner-occupied short-term rentals, and establish clear guidelines.

Following this, existing investor housing portfolios would be reduced by 50% over five years (10% annually). New acquisitions by large corporate landlords would be restricted, and new non-owner-occupied short-term rental conversions could be limited to prevent circumvention.

For corporate-owned single-family homes, current tenants would have the first right of refusal. If declined, owner-occupants would have an exclusive purchase period. Subsequently, community land trusts and qualified nonprofit housing organizations could acquire the property for affordable housing before it re-enters the general investor market.

Short-term rental property divestment would follow a similar principle. Houses and condominiums could be sold to resident owner-occupants. For non-individually sellable properties (e.g., apartments), divestment could be satisfied by returning units to long-term residential rental use. A fundamental tenet is tenant protection; no tenant shall be displaced solely to fulfill the divestment mandate.

Increase Housing AvailabilityReturning existing single-family homes held by corporate investors to the ownership market would increase housing availability. Halving the estimated 3,000 institutionally held Kansas homes would reintroduce roughly 1,500 single-family homes over five years. While this alone won’t dramatically lower statewide housing prices, it would significantly affect neighborhoods with concentrated investor ownership.

Corporate ownership also influences rental rates. Research indicates institutional investors increase rents by about 60% more than the average upon acquisition, and neighborhoods with higher institutional ownership see faster rent increases than those with more landlord-owned properties (Lee & Wylie, 2024). The short-term rental component could more directly impact long-term housing supply. A study on Los Angeles County found that policies reducing short-term rental listings by approximately 50% led to a 2% reduction in both rents and home prices (Koster et al., 2021).

While Kansas may not see an identical reduction, this research shows the potential outcomes when a substantial number of short-term rentals return to residential use, particularly in areas where they make up a significant share of available housing. Together, these policies would increase homes available to buyers, convert short-term rentals to long-term housing, reduce competition between families and large investors, and put downward pressure on rents and home prices. This approach directly addresses existing housing supply rather than relying solely on new construction.

Investor-Funded TransitionThis program should be primarily financed by companies and commercial operators who profit from residential housing as an investment. Kansas could implement an annual housing-impact fee on large corporate single-family portfolios. For example, a $1,000 annual fee per covered home would generate approximately $3 million annually if applied to the estimated 3,000 homes currently held by institutional investors.

Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals would be subject to a separate annual registration and housing-impact fee. Wichita currently charges $225 annually per short-term rental license, with revenue directed toward administering and enforcing the program (City of Wichita, 2026).

Housing-impact revenue exceeding administrative costs would help return these properties to resident use. Funding could provide down-payment and closing-cost assistance for tenants and first-time buyers, help community land trusts acquire properties, and support nonprofit housing organizations in purchasing homes that might otherwise return to the investor market.

Most homes would not require state purchase. Residents acquiring divested properties could use conventional mortgage financing, while public funding would focus on purchase assistance, nonprofit acquisition, and permanently affordable housing initiatives. This strategy would enable Kansas to return existing housing to residents without taxpayers financing the full purchase price of thousands of homes.

Reducing the Cost of Basic Necessities

In a consumer-driven society, fulfilling fundamental human needs often necessitates commercial transactions. Most individuals do not produce their own food, manufacture household goods, or reside in dwellings independent of commercial utilities and manufactured products.

The current societal framework requires people to purchase certain necessities for safe living, home maintenance, and participation in daily life. Taxing these essential purchases effectively generates revenue from expenditures individuals have no realistic alternative but to incur.

Housing requires sanitation; workplaces and educational institutions demand basic standards of cleanliness and hygiene; and universal human experiences such as menstruation, child-rearing, illness, disability, and aging create demands that the marketplace must address. Consequently, a significant portion of consumer spending is not truly discretionary.

Eliminating Sales Tax on Basic NecessitiesAddressing this issue requires a collaborative state and local initiative in which Kansas law establishes a statewide exemption rather than allowing individual cities and counties to opt in. While Kansas has eliminated the state sales tax on groceries, local sales taxes continue to apply. In 2026, Representative Nick Hoheisel (R) introduced HB 2456, which would have permitted cities and counties to reduce their local sales and use tax on food and food ingredients to zero. The bill failed to advance from the House Committee on Taxation, chaired by Representative Adam Smith (R), thus precluding a full House vote (Kansas State Legislature, 2026).

Kansas lawmakers have also proposed removing sales taxes from other essential items. In 2022, Senator Ethan Corson (D) introduced SB 516, which sought to exempt antiperspirants, cotton swabs, dental floss, deodorants, diapers, menstrual cups, mouthwash, panty liners, sanitary napkins, shampoo, soaps and cleaning solutions, suntan lotions, sunscreens, tampons, toilet tissue, and toothpaste. This bill also died in the Senate Committee on Assessment and Taxation, chaired by Senator Caryn Tyson (R), and did not proceed to a full Senate vote (Kansas State Legislature, 2022).

In 2026, Senator Cindy Holscher (D) introduced SB 389, proposing an exemption for menstrual hygiene products, children’s and adult diapers, and incontinence products. This bill was initially referred to the Senate Committee on Assessment and Taxation, chaired by Senator Caryn Tyson (R), then transferred to the Senate Committee on Local Government, Transparency and Ethics, chaired by Senator Elaine Bowers (R). It subsequently died without advancing to a full Senate vote (Kansas State Legislature, 2026).

Kansas should now consolidate and substantially expand these previous efforts into a comprehensive statewide policy. Groceries and essential personal and household necessities should be entirely exempt from sales tax at all levels, including state, county, city, and other local taxes. In addition to the products covered by prior legislative proposals, the exemption should encompass over-the-counter contraception, basic personal hygiene products, paper towels and other essential household paper products, laundry detergent, dish soap and dishwasher detergent, trash bags, basic household cleaners and disinfectants, sponges and other basic cleaning supplies, and other products vital for maintaining a safe and sanitary home environment. The enabling legislation should meticulously define these categories to include ordinary necessities while excluding luxury, cosmetic, premium, or specialty products.

Increasing Household Disposable IncomeKansas has previously examined components of this proposal, and the state’s own estimates reveal the potential financial benefit for Kansans. Groceries represent the largest segment of this proposal. Although Kansas eliminated the state grocery sales tax in 2025, local sales taxes persist. In 2025, the state estimated that eliminating the remaining 2% state grocery tax would return $156 million annually to Kansans. This estimate suggests approximately $7.8 billion in annual taxable grocery purchases. Applying Kansas’s current average local sales-tax rate of 2.21% to this amount indicates that Kansans still pay about $172 million annually in local sales taxes on groceries (Kansas Office of the Governor, 2025; Tax Foundation, 2026).

The fiscal note for SB 389 estimated that Kansans would retain $11.3 million in state sales taxes in the first full year, increasing to approximately $12.4 million annually by FY 2028, with additional local taxes not calculated (Kansas Division of the Budget, 2026). SB 516 estimated that its exemption would return between $19.7 million and $22.3 million annually in state sales taxes to Kansans (Kansas Division of the Budget, 2022).

Because the two bills overlap, their estimates cannot be aggregated. Using SB 516 as the broader baseline, incorporating the incontinence products covered by SB 389 but not explicitly included in SB 516, and then accounting for local sales taxes, the combined savings from the products addressed by these two bills would be approximately $35 million annually. This current proposal extends even further. Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics household spending data, adding more necessities could allow Kansans to retain an additional $25 million to $30 million annually in state and local sales taxes (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2025; Tax Foundation, 2026).

Combined with the estimated $172 million Kansans currently pay in local grocery taxes, the full proposal could leave approximately $230 million to $240 million annually in Kansans’ pockets, with $235 million as a reasonable central estimate. This represents not merely a “loss” of government revenue, but about $235 million each year that Kansans could keep instead of paying taxes on necessities for which they have limited or no realistic alternatives.

Offsetting Costs Through Corporate Subsidy ReallocationThe estimated $235 million in state and local revenue could be offset by reducing corporate subsidies, tax incentives, and economic-development allocations, with the state funding compensation to cities and counties for lost revenue. In FY 2025, Kansas awarded approximately $453.4 million through just five major business incentive programs, nearly double the amount required to implement a statewide sales tax exemption for groceries and essential personal and household necessities (Kansas Department of Commerce, 2026). Redirecting slightly more than half of that amount would cover the estimated cost.

Making Full-Time Work Sustainable

Kansas workers worry their paychecks no longer go as far. The cost of living has outpaced wage growth, eroding household financial stability. For instance, median gross rent in Kansas surged by nearly 58% from 2010 to today, from approximately $671 to $1,060 per month. Over a similar period, residential electricity rates climbed by about 65% since 2009, while overall prices across the Midwest increased by approximately 51% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2024; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026).

These escalating costs diminish disposable income. A wage increase offers little improvement if rising expenses for housing, utilities, food, transportation, healthcare, and other necessities entirely absorb it, preventing financial security. Consequently, many full-time workers cover basic expenses but lack a financial cushion for emergencies, retirement, or investments. The challenge extends beyond low wages; current earnings often fail to provide the financial security full-time employment should offer.

Raise the Minimum Wage to $21To address these challenges, we propose raising the Kansas minimum wage to $21 an hour and indexing future increases to inflation. This increase should be implemented gradually over several years to give employers time to adjust.

To support this transition, Kansas should implement temporary, targeted tax relief for qualifying small businesses. Eligibility criteria based on size, revenue, payroll, and profitability metrics would ensure the program benefits genuinely small employers. This tax credit could offset a portion of increased payroll costs during the phase-in period, gradually decreasing as the higher wage becomes integrated into normal operating expenses. This approach would mitigate the immediate impact without permanently subsidizing businesses.

Nonprofit organizations, which provide essential services without generating profits and operate under restricted funding models, require a distinct approach. Kansas should establish a needs-based nonprofit wage-support program that allows eligible organizations to apply for direct assistance to cover additional payroll costs. Eligibility criteria should consider financial need, available reserves, executive compensation, funding restrictions, and the criticality of services provided.

Public-benefit programs should also be adjusted to ensure assistance phases out gradually as wages rise. Workers should not experience a net loss in benefits—such as childcare assistance, healthcare, food assistance, or housing support—that negates the value of a wage increase.

Increase Household IncomeA $21 minimum wage would substantially increase purchasing power for Kansas workers. The clearest way to understand the scale is to separate the workers included in Kansas’s existing minimum-wage analysis from those earning between $16 and $21, whose numbers must be estimated from statewide wage-distribution data.

Kansas’s 2026 fiscal analysis identified 173,580 workers earning less than $16 an hour. Raising their wages to $21 would increase their combined annual earnings by about $2.62 billion.
Statewide wage-distribution data indicate that roughly another 415,000 workers earn between $16 and $21 an hour. Bringing those workers to $21 would add an estimated $2.16 billion in annual wages.
Together, about 589,000 Kansas workers could receive direct wage increases, totaling about $4.8 billion annually (Kansas Division of the Budget, 2026; Kansas Department of Labor, 2025).

That $4.8 billion would materially alter the financial position of hundreds of thousands of Kansas households. Workers would have greater capacity to absorb rent increases, utility bills, medical costs, car repairs, debt payments, and other unavoidable expenses without a single setback immediately becoming a crisis. More households could build emergency savings, contribute to retirement, and create some distance between themselves and financial instability.

The effect would likely extend beyond workers currently earning less than $21. Employers generally maintain wage differences between entry-level employees, experienced workers, supervisors, and specialized positions. Raising the wage floor would therefore put pressure on wages above $21 as employers adjust pay scales to preserve those differences. The $4.8 billion estimate does not include those secondary wage increases.

Higher wages would also produce additional public revenue. Applying the same 5.2% marginal income-tax assumption used by the Kansas Department of Revenue in its 2026 minimum-wage analysis, approximately $4.8 billion in additional wages could generate roughly $250 million in additional state income-tax revenue each year. That estimate does not include increased sales-tax revenue as households spend more of their income on taxable goods and services, nor does it include additional income-tax revenue generated by wage increases above the new minimum (Kansas Division of the Budget, 2026).

That increased purchasing power would also flow back into the small businesses and nonprofits often cited as reasons to oppose higher wages. Workers with more disposable income can spend more at locally owned businesses, purchase services, attend events, support community organizations, and make charitable donations. That would not eliminate every payroll challenge, particularly for organizations operating on restricted budgets. Still, it would strengthen the customer and donor base those organizations depend on and make higher wages more sustainable throughout the economy.

The result would be billions of additional dollars circulating through Kansas households and the broader state economy. A $21 minimum wage would not, by itself, guarantee the quality of life described throughout this article. Still, it would move hundreds of thousands of workers substantially closer to financial stability while expanding the state’s revenue base.

Four-Phase Minimum Wage Transition

Phase 1: Preparation Year. This phase involves no wage increase. We estimate $5 million to develop application and verification systems, establish administrative procedures, train staff, prepare enforcement systems, implement necessary benefit-program changes, and support state and local implementation efforts. This estimate is based on comparable Kansas programs that required new application systems, programming, eligibility review, reporting, testing, training, and administration (Kansas Department of Commerce, 2021; Kansas Division of the Budget, 2026). Without wage increases, no additional wage-related income-tax revenue will be generated. Therefore, a temporary corporate surtax will cover the entire $5 million startup cost.

Phase 2: $15 per Hour. Public costs are estimated to rise to approximately $165 million. This includes small-business transition credits, nonprofit wage assistance, benefit-cliff protections, state payroll increases, and ongoing state and local administration and enforcement. Higher wages are projected to generate approximately $55 million in additional state income-tax revenue, leaving an unfunded balance of approximately $110 million for this phase. The temporary corporate surtax would contribute approximately $71.6 million. A reserve established by the surtax across the transition period and, if necessary, other general state revenue generated by the wage increase (including additional taxable spending) would cover the remaining deficit.

Phase 3: $18 per Hour. Public costs are estimated at approximately $170 million. The increased wage is projected to generate an estimated $98 million in additional state income-tax revenue, resulting in an unfunded balance of approximately $72 million. At this point, the temporary corporate surtax would nearly entirely cover the remaining financial need. The amount requiring separate state financing would have significantly decreased, even as worker wages continued to rise.

Phase 4: $21 per Hour. Public costs are estimated at approximately $210 million. At the $21 wage floor, additional wages are estimated to generate approximately $249 million in state income-tax revenue. This would put projected new income-tax revenue about $39 million above the program’s modeled public cost. Because the program is now projected to generate sufficient additional state revenue to cover its own public costs, the temporary corporate surtax would conclude.

During the subsequent year, the small-business transition credit would enter its final tapering phase. Public costs are estimated to decrease to approximately $180 million, while additional income-tax revenue would remain around $249 million or more, increasing the surplus to roughly $69 million.

Across Phases 1, 2, and 3, the amount requiring external funding is estimated at approximately $187 million. The temporary 1% corporate surtax would generate about $71.6 million annually, or roughly $215 million over those three years. This would cover the estimated early transition costs and establish approximately $28 million as a reserve should actual costs exceed planning estimates.

These calculations do not account for additional state, city, and county sales-tax revenue generated by increased worker disposable income. They also exclude additional income-tax revenue from workers already earning more than $21 whose wages may rise as employers adjust their pay scales.

The funding structure is therefore temporary by design. Large, profitable corporations finance the preparation and early transition. As wages rise, additional worker earnings generate more state revenue and progressively replace that temporary funding. By the time the $21 wage is fully implemented, the temporary corporate tax ends, and the higher wage base supports the remaining public costs.

Fund with a Temporary 1% Corporate SurtaxThis proposal outlines a statewide policy with joint state and local administration. Kansas would establish wage requirements, an automatic inflation adjustment mechanism, eligibility criteria, assistance programs, and a centralized application system. Cities and counties would support local outreach, ensure employer compliance, verify applications as needed, and help enforce the program. Because local participation would be mandatory, Kansas would also fund associated administrative costs, avoiding an unfunded mandate on local governments.

Kansas would finance the initial implementation phase through a temporary corporate funding mechanism specifically designed for this policy. Kansas would levy an additional 1% surtax on the portion of Kansas taxable income exceeding $1 million for corporations within the highest income bracket. Small businesses would be exempt from this surtax. This temporary tax would apply only during the preparatory year and the first two phases of wage increases, a period when policy expenditures are projected to surpass the new state revenue generated by higher wages.

Data from the Kansas Department of Revenue indicate that only 938 corporate returns fell into the state’s highest reported taxable-income category (above $1 million). However, these corporations accounted for $565.2 million, or 91.5%, of Kansas’s corporate income-tax liability in the reported data. Based on these figures and Kansas’s current corporate tax structure, corporations in this group had an estimated $7.16 billion in taxable income exceeding the initial $1 million threshold. A temporary additional 1% surtax on that portion would generate approximately $71.6 million annually. This is a modeled estimate, not an official fiscal note, but it is based on Kansas Department of Revenue tax-return data (Kansas Department of Revenue, 2024).

This temporary surtax primarily aims to finance the transition period as wage increases are phased in. As wages rise, Kansas will progressively collect increased income-tax revenue from the additional earnings. This new revenue will gradually diminish the need for the temporary corporate funding. Once the $21 wage is fully implemented and the additional tax revenue is projected to exceed the program’s public cost, the corporate surtax will be discontinued.

It Is Not About Money. It Is About Priorities.

Kansas and Wichita do not lack public resources; the question is how they use them. Governments routinely approve tax abatements, exemptions, subsidies, incentives, and other financial assistance for corporations, developers, and economic-development projects, framing them as economic investments.

The three solutions outlined here demonstrate that government can make different choices. Government can use public resources to help return housing to residents, eliminate taxes on groceries and other necessities, support small businesses and nonprofits through a higher minimum-wage transition, and protect workers from losing essential benefits as their wages rise.

When corporations or developers request public assistance, the discussion often centers on economic growth and future returns. However, when working households need lower housing costs, relief from taxes on necessities, or wages that better reflect the cost of living, the first question is often how the government could afford it. This difference is not simply about money; it is about priorities.

Public money should create measurable public benefit. If taxpayers forgo revenue or government directs money toward economic development, the return should be visible in the lives of the people who fund and sustain that economy: more housing available to residents, lower everyday expenses, stronger wages, greater household financial stability, and fewer people pushed into housing insecurity.

Kansas and Wichita do not have to keep directing public resources toward the top and hoping the benefits eventually reach everyone else. They can choose to invest directly in the people who live, work, raise families, and build their lives here.

The money is there. It is time to decide who it is supposed to help.

Make Sure They Know What Matters to You

Do not let these ideas end on a screen. Contact the Wichita mayor and City Council and tell them what you expect: them to implement solutions that invest in the people!

Contact the Wichita Mayor and City Council

Then take the same message to Topeka. Find your current Kansas House and Senate members and tell them what affordability and quality of life actually mean to you.

Find and contact your Kansas legislators.

And remember who is asking for your vote. Kansas is in an election year. The governor and all 125 seats in the Kansas House are on the 2026 ballot. Look at the candidates running to represent you and ask them where they stand on these solutions.

See Kansas 2026 candidate information.

Wichita will have another local election cycle next year. Do not wait until a ballot is in front of you to decide what matters. Contact elected officials now, question candidates when they ask for your support, and make sure they know what you expect: solutions like these.

Come November, vote like your quality of life is on the ballot because it is.